INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly common litigation strategy,1 plaintiffs in Patrickson v. Dole Fo od Company,2 laborers in the banana industries of Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and Panama, brought a class action suit in Hawaii state court against Dole Food and other defen dants.3 Plaintiffs brought only state law causes of action, alleging that they had been harmed by Dole Food's use of DBCP, a toxic pesticide banned from use in the United States.4 Dole Food removed the case to federal district court seeking the procedural advantages of a federal forum,5 as corporate defendants facing alien tort plaintiffs seeking re dress for overseas conduct invariably do. The advantages Dole Food sought from a federal forum included: stricter standing requirements, stricter burdens of proof,6 and a more liberal standard for forum non conveniens dismissal.7 Of these, federal forum non conveniens doc trine was, arguably, Dole Food's strongest weapon. A forum non con veniens dismissal that forces plaintiffs to seek recovery in Central American courts, as was the case in Patrickson, generally equates to a victory for a corporate defendant.8 As is often the case, the district court granted Dole Food's motion to dismiss based on forum non con veniens.9
On appeal, plaintiffs sought to void the removal to federal court, and the subsequent dismissal, by arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.10 Plaintiffs chose to file suit in Hawaii state court in order to avoid removal based on diversity jurisdiction,11 forc ing Dole Food to argue that a federal question was raised by the com-plaint.12 Dole Food responded that the complaint implicated the fed eral common law of foreign relations,13 thereby raising federal ques tion subject matter jurisdiction ("federal question jurisdiction").14 The Nimh Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and remanded the case to Hawaii state court. 15 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit split with the Torres v. Southern Peru Copp er Corp.16 line of cases ("the To rres approach") from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.17 In To rres , 700 Peruvian miners brought 12. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 798; see 15 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103 (3d ed. 1998) (providing general discussion of federal question jurisdiction); see also infra Section I.A.1 (discussing federal question jurisdiction).
13. Unlike state courts, federal courts do not have broad powers to develop common law, but they may develop common law in matters delegated to the federal government by the Constitution. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters gov erned by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State .... There is no federal general common law."). Once made, federal common law, via the Supremacy Clause, pre-empts state law. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972) (holding federal common law has the same status as federal statutory law). Unlike constitutional decisions, Congress may overrule federal com mon law by statute. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315-32 (1981) (holding that congressional pollution act overrules previous federal common law pollution claims). Generally, federal courts are hesitant to make federal common law, recognizing that Con gress should make such decisions. See Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) . Nevertheless, federal courts will create and apply federal common law in two gen eral areas: (1) those where Congress has left the development of the law to the courts and (2) those areas where a uniquely federal interest is at stake and there is no applicable federal statute. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) . Federal com mon law of foreign relations is an example of the second category of federal common law. Federal common law of foreign relations seldom, if ever, entirely pre-empts state causes of action. Rather, it supplies the governing standard for certain foreign affairs issues that arise within the context of state causes of action. For example, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab batino, only the issue of the validity of Cuba's expropriation decree was governed by the federal common law of foreign relations. The other elements of the underlying conversion tort remained governed by state law. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964) . See infra Sec tion l.A.2 for a discussion of federal common law of foreign relations.
14. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 799. 15. Id. at 804-05, 808-09. 17. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1998) (apply ing the Torres approach, but finding no federal question jurisdiction); Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997) (same), vacated on other grounds, 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) (en bane), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 526 U.S. 574 (1999); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding federal question jurisdic tion extends to state causes of action brought by foreign plaintiffs that implicate important interests for foreign sovereigns when the foreign sovereign is not a party to the litigation); Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 531-32 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (indicating in dicta that federal question jurisdiction extends to state causes of action brought by class action plaintiffs, including Americans, tha t implicate important interests for foreign sover eigns when the foreign sovereign is not a party to the litigation); Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1355-57 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (holding federal question state tort causes of action in Texas state court against an American multinational mining corporation.18 The defendant, Southern Peru Copper Corporation ("SPCC"), removed to federal court and was granted a forum non conveniens dismissal.19 As in Patrickson, the To rres plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.20 The government of Peru, although not a party to the dispute, filed statements in opposition to the plaintiffs ' case with the State Department and with the court. 21 The Fifth Circuit found that federal question jurisdiction existed in this case, thus the removal and the subsequent dismissal were proper. 22 This Note argues that foreign plaintiffs should be able to sue American multinational corporations in state courts. Part I advances the most charitable readings of both the To rres approach and the Patrickson challenge to that view. Part II contends that while the Patrickson court reaches the correct result, it fundamentally misinter prets the To rres approach, thereby failing to attack the core deficien cies of the Torres approach. Part III argues that the foreign sovereign conduct approach, an alternative analysis of the federal common law of foreign relations, best reflects established case law. This Note con cludes that providing foreign plaintiffs an opportunity to seek redress in state courts fosters corporate responsibility among American multi national companies.
I. FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: EXPANSIVE AND RESTRICTIVE JURISDICTIONAL VIEWS
Corporate defendants such as SPCC and Dole Food often rely upon expansive notions of federal question jurisdiction to remove cases to federal court, in an effort to avoid an on the merits defense of their conduct abroad. Part I advances the most charitable readings of the To rres and Patrickson resolutions of this issue. Section I.A pro vides a doctrinal argument on behalf of the To rres approach. Section LB presents the doctrinal arguments implicitly relied upon by the Pa trickson court.
jurisdiction extends to state causes of action brought by an American plaintiff that implicate important interests for a foreign sovereign when the foreign sovereign is not a party to the litigation); see also 
A. Th e Torres App roach
The Torres approach extends federal question jurisdiction to state causes of action that significantly affect the vital economic and sover eign interests of foreign states, even when a foreign sovereign is not a party to the litigation.23 The To rres court presents precious little argu ment itself in support of its extension of federal question jurisdiction, citing only two supporting cases and devoting merely one page of the Fe deral Reporter to the approach.24 This section formulates a doctrinal defense on behalf of the Torres approach. Although this approach is ultimately untenable, this Section argues that it is best understood as a specific application of the well-pleaded complaint rule that is triggered when two additional criteria are met: (1) the foreign government in volved lodges a protest with the court and (2) both the plaintiffs and the inj uries complained of are of foreign origin.25 1. The Torres Approach's Consistency with the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule
The Fifth Circuit views the Torres approach as "a very specific ap plication of the well-pleaded complaint rule,"26 noting that, even within the erudite realm of federal common law of foreign relations, the well-pleaded complaint rule applies.27 As such, proponents of the Torres approach do not view it as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, as its opponents contend,28 but rather as an independ ent corollary to it.29 23. Id. at 542-43.
24. Id. One of the cited cases, Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. , 451 U.S. 630 (1981 ) , is cited only to support the proposition that federal courts can make federal common Jaw -not particularly specific grounds for support. See 107 (3d ed. 1998) (providing general discus sion of removal doctrine). Assuming personal jurisdiction, a case may only be originally fi led in federal court if the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the issue). See, e.g. , FED. R. CIV. P. 12h(3). As such, the analysis for determining legitimate removal to federal court is identical to the subject matter jurisdiction analysis applied to cases originally filed in a fed eral court. See 16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14 (3d ed. 1998).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). For the remainder of this Note the term "federal question jurisdiction" will refer to the statutory grant of jurisdiction, namely 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Refer ence to the broad scope of the constitutional grant of fe deral question jurisdiction will be made by explicit reference the Constitution. In To rres, SPCC presented the novel, but ultimately flawed, argu ment that the plaintiffs' complaint implicated the federal common law of foreign relations.s2 SPCC argued that this was the case because Peru's vital economic and sovereign interests were at stake.s3 SPCC was the largest mining company in Peru, an industry that accounted for fifty percent of Peru's export income and eleven percent of its gross domestic product.s4 The court accepted, without citing any authority, SPCC's view that a vital, Peruvian economic interest was at stake.ss The court found, again without citing authority, that the sover eign interests of Peru were involved because it owned the land upon which SPCC mined, owned the extracted minerals, granted SPCC con cessions, and actually owned the mining refinery itself until 1994. Court held that the federal common law of foreign relations must pro vide the governing standard for international law issues, even in diver sity cases, to protect the uniquely federal interest in conducting for eign affairs from potentially parochial and divergent judgments of the several states.66 (Although federal common law of foreign relations is often implicated by state causes of action, it seldom pre-empts state causes of action entirely; rather, it governs specific foreign affairs is sues within the context of the state cause of action.67) Following Sabbatino, the Second Circuit, in Marcos, expanded federal common law of foreign relations to govern issues that "directly and significantly affect American foreign relations."68 Conventionally, this line of cases has come to stand for the proposition that federal courts can make federal common law in nearly all areas significantly affecting interna tional affairs.69 Despite this strong conventional view, neither the Sabbatino nor the Marcos decision held that litigation affecting vital economic and sovereign interests significantly affects American for- properly instructs federal courts to refrain from engaging in foreign policy issues); Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1690-98 (outlining the detrimental impact of this reading of Sabbatino); Weisburd, supra, at 20-27 (arguing that the "foreign means fed eral" approach is too broad).
eign relations.70 The Torres court, by finding that these interests do implicate significant foreign affairs issues, expanded federal common law of foreign relations doctrine beyond its traditional limits.71
Protest by a Fo reign Nation is Necessary to Trigger the Torres

Approach
Not every case implicating vital economic and sovereign interests of foreign states properly calls for federal question jurisdiction under the Torres approach. Proponents of the Torres approach contend that two triggering criteria must be met as well.72 These criteria are concep tually distinct from the well-pleaded complaint rule and federal com mon law elements of the Torres approach, because the triggering criteria perform a restrictive function. That is to say, the Torres ap proach expands federal question jurisdiction while the triggering criteria limit the range of cases to which the approach might otherwise be applied.
For the Torres extension of federal question jurisdiction to apply, it is necessary, but not sufficient, for the foreign government to lodge a protest with the court.73 In Torres and Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G.,74 Peru and Germany, respectively, filed amicus briefs with the court in opposition to the litigation.75 The Fifth Circuit found that this involvement by the foreign sovereigns did "not, standing alone, create a question of federal law."76 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit, in Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co .,77 stated that, without a protest from the foreign nation involved, it was reluctant to find that the plaintiff's claims implicated important foreign policy issues that provide grounds for federal question jurisdiction.78 Although the court provided no The term triggering criteria is the author's, not the courts'. As argued infra, these criteria limit the range of cases to which the approach might otherwise be applied.
73. Pa checo de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1378 (finding Venezuela's lack of protest indicative that no significant foreign relations issues are at stake); Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 320 (find ing Germany's protest of the suit not sufficient grounds for jurisdiction); Torres, 113 F.3d at 542-43 (finding Peru's protest alone insufficient grounds for jurisdiction). doctrinal rationale for this decision,79 the court reasoned that Vene zuela's lack of protest was "significant" as an indication that substan tial foreign policy concerns were not raised by the complaint.80
Fo reign Plaintiffs Injured on Fo reign Soil Necessary to Trigger
Torres Approach
The Torres extension of federal question jurisdiction applies only when foreign plaintiffs seek recovery for injuries that occurred entirely on foreign soil.81 None of the courts that adhere to the Torres ap proach cite any authority for this proposition or provide any other ar gumentation in defense of this triggering criterion.82 Perhaps the best defense is that it represents a federalism concern. Namely, suits brought under state law to recover for wrongs that occurred within the state's territory should remain, absent diversity jurisdiction, in state court as a matter of judicial federalism.83 Torres approach represents an illegitimate exception to the well pleaded complaint rule, the approach misconstrues the federal com mon law of foreign relations, and foreign governmental protest has no logical relationship to federal question jurisdiction.87 This Section ad dresses these arguments in turn.
Th e Torres Approach Represents an Illegitimate Exception to the
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Although the Fifth Circuit fashioned the To rres approach as "a very specific application of the well-pleaded complaint rule,"88 the Ninth Circuit reads the Torres approach as an exception to the well pleaded complaint rule.89 This disagreement forms the crux of the Patrickson court's argument against the To rres approach.
The Patrickson court argues that the plaintiffs' assertion of "fed eral right or immunity," not Dole Food's defenses, establishes federal question jurisdiction in accordance with the well-pleaded complaint rule.90 In so arguing, the court makes implicit reference to the Holmes test.91 Following the Holmes test, a plaintiff's cause of action must be created by federal law to give rise to federal question jurisdiction. 92 The court concludes that because the plaintiffs' complaint turns en tirely upon state law, any federal issues arising in the case, such as fed eral common law of foreign relations, could only be raised as a de fense.93 Thus, the court concludes that the To rres approach must represent an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.94
Although the Patrickson court stops here, the argument is incom plete. The court tacitly relies upon the proposition that courts cannot fashion exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule. It is possible to formulate a doctrinal argument on the Patrickson court's behalf. There is only one exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule: fed eral officers may establish federal question jurisdiction via a federal defense.95 Importantly, Congress created this exception, not the 87. Id 98. See Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 804 ("If federal courts are so much better suited than state courts for handling cases that might raise foreign policy concerns, Congress will surely pass a statute giving us that jurisdiction.").
99. See id. at 804-05. The Patrickson court also notes that Congress has not acted to grant jurisdiction beyond § 1331 to cases that raise the federal common law of foreign rela tions as a defense. Id. at 803. The court runs through a list of statutory grants of jurisdiction relating to foreign affairs. Id. The court notices that "[w]hat Congress has not done is to ex tend federal-question jurisdiction to all suits where the federal common law of foreign rela tions might arise as an issue." Id. Thus, the court concludes that, excepting the possible ap plicability of § 1331, there are no grounds for federal question jurisdiction. Id. 100. Id 113. Id. at 800. However, the court realizes, along with most other courts and scholars, that "Marcos clearly said more, broadly suggesting that federal-question jurisdiction could 'probably' be premised on the fact that a case may affect our nation's foreign relations." Id. at 802. The court argues that this reading of Marcos is incompatible with its "act of state" reading of Sabbatino. Id. As such, i• rejects this reading. Id. 114. See id. at 802 ("But Sabbatino does not say that federal courts alone are competent to develop this body of law."); id. at 803 ("We see no reason to treat the federal common law of foreign relations any differently than other areas of federal law [and would allow state courts to apply it].").
115. See A necessary condition for triggering the To rres approach is that the foreign government involved in the litigation -but not a party to it -file a brief opposing the litigation.118 The Patrickson court criti cizes this proposition both as a matter of doctrine and as a matter of institutional competency.119
The court levels the doctrinal attack first.120 The Patrickson court characterizes the governmental protest element of the Torres ap proach as standing "for the proposition that federal courts may assert jurisdiction over a case simply because a foreign government has ex pressed a special interest in its outcome."121 The court argues that there is no logical connection between a foreign government's opposi tion to litigation, in which it is not a party, and federal question juris diction, as there is no doctrinal hook upon which to hang this trigger ing element of the Torres approach.122
Further, in the court's view, as a matter of institutional compe tence, the executive branch provides the appropriate venue for foreign governments to express their displeasure with litigation in the United States's courts.123 The judiciary is uniquely the most incompetent branch of government to make foreign policy judgments as called for in the To rres approach.124 This is the case, as "the federal courts have little context or expertise by which to analyze and address the potenis a presumption of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over all federal law that can only be overcome by explicit congressional command, unmistakable legislative history, or a clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests). The Patrickson court provides three critiques of To rres; namely, the approach represents an illegitimate exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, the approach misconstrues the federal common law of foreign relations, and foreign governmental protest has no logical rela tionship to federal question jurisdiction.127 Section II.A addresses these in turn, arguing that the court misinterprets the Torres approach, resulting in an unconvincing, straw man critique.
Patrickson Ignores the Necessary Construction Test as It Relates to the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
The Patrickson court argues that the To rres approach represents an illegitimate exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, even though proponents of the approach present it as a specific application of the rule.128 This forms the heart of the Patrickson challenge.129 In so arguing, the Ninth Circuit sought to establish federal question jurisdic tion via the Holmes test130 -one of two independent tests for deter mining federal question jurisdiction. A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to pre-empt state law. Even without an express provision for pre-emption, we have fo und that state law must yield to a congressional Act in at least two circumstances. When Congress intends fed eral law to occupy the field, state law in that area is pre-empted. And even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally pre-empted to the extent of any conflict with a fe deral statute. We will find pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law, and where under the circumstances of a particular case, the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and in tended effects .... the best reading of Patrickson on this point, the argument is again ir relevant -or at best incomplete. Proving that the Torres approach does not conform to one method of passing the necessary construction test does not prove that the approach fails to conform to other meth ods of passing the necessary construction test. The second possible reading here is that pleading congressional action pre-empting state law is the sole method of passing the necessary construction test.149 This reading simply misstates necessary construction test doctrine as pre-emption doctrine, but, as argued above, the necessary construction test and preemption doctrine are not one in the same analyses.150 As such, the Patrickson court's well-pleaded complaint rule argument fails to undercut the Torres approach's position.
Patrickson's View of Fe deral Common Law of Fo reign Relations is Too Restrictive
The Torres approach to the federal common law of foreign rela tions encompasses claims affecting the vital economic and sovereign interests of a foreign state even when the foreign state is not a party.151 The Patrickson court argues that To rres ' treatment of federal common law of foreign relations is too expansive.152 The court presents two dis tinct arguments here.153 First, the court argues that case law only sup ports viewing federal common law of foreign relations as applicable when the validity of an act of a foreign state is in question.154 Second, the Patrickson court argues that the To rres approach's vesting of ex clusive jurisdiction in the federal courts is beyond the power of a lower federal court.155 In formulating its critique, Patrickson misinterprets the To rres approach and the surrounding doctrine, thereby offering criticisms of a straw man version of To rres.
Beginning with the Patrickson court's second argument, the court properly admonishes those who would claim exclusive jurisdiction for the federal courts over federal common law of foreign relations is sues.156 As the Ninth Circuit notes, all species of federal common law 167. See Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1632 n.62 (stating that, in addition to himself, only Peter J. Shiro and Arthur M. Weisburd would radically limit the scope of the federal common law of foreign relations). The author of this Note would add Jack I. Garvey to Professor Goldsmith's list. Garvey, supra note 69, at 474-76 (although not directly ad dressing federal common law of foreign relations, Garvey argues that Sabbatino, properly understood, prohibits federal courts from getting involved in foreign affairs issues).
168. E.g. , Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 52, at 1710-11 (conceding that a 'motive review' of state court decisions within the foreign affairs arena under federal common law of foreign relations could be justified); Peter J. Spiro, Th e States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 161-74 (1994) (arguing that the externalities logic for uniform federal laws in international issues is obsolete insofar as foreign states can eco nomically retaliate against individual states, but noting there is presently a slim basis for rec ognizing that targeted retaliation is a trend); Weisburd, supra note 69, at 59 (arguing that federal common law of foreign relations should be restricted to three distinct areas). 182. Zsch ernig, 389 U.S. at 441. restrictive view.183 Although lower courts have given Zschernig a nar rower reading in recent years,184 the Supreme Court has not overruled it.185 As such, the Ninth Circuit continues to be bound by Zschernig, rendering the court's ultra-restrictive view of federal common law of foreign relations untenable.
Patrickson Misinterprets the Torres Triggering Criteria
The Torres approach incorporates two triggering criteria.186 The Patrickson court challenges one of them; namely, the triggering ele ment requiring foreign governments to protest the litigation before a grant of federal question jurisdiction will be considered.187 The Ninth Circuit leveled two attacks on this score: a doctrinal concern, arguing that subject matter jurisdiction has no logical connection to foreign governmental protest,188 and an institutional competence concern, ar guing that the courts are uniquely unqualified to determine when is sues substantially affect foreign relations.189 The court finds these criti cisms fatal for the To rres approach.190 Although the substance of these challenges are persuasive, the Patrickson court fails to properly under stand the triggering criterion itself and the role it plays in the Torres approach, leading the court to overstate its conclusion.
The Ninth Circuit declines to follow the To rres approach "insofar as (it] stand[ s] for the proposition that the federal courts may assert jurisdiction over a case simply because a foreign government has ex pressed a special interest in its outcome."191 The court construes the foreign government's protest of the litigation as a sufficient condition for applying the To rres approach.192 As was previously argued, the for eign government's protest of the litigation is a necessary -not suffi- Putting this misunderstanding aside, the Patrickson court does go on to argue convincingly that a foreign government's protest of a case has no logical connection to the granting of federal question jurisdic tion -even as a necessary condition.195 This is not a damning blow to the To rres approach. Foreign government protest of litigation is but a triggering criterion for the To rres approach.196 It is conceptually dis tinct from the To rres approach proper because it performs a limiting function -not an expansive function as the other elements of the ap proach do. As such, the To rres approach is conceptually feasible with out the foreign government's protest of the litigation as a triggering criterion -it is simply more expansive. Ironically, the Patrickson court's critique merely severs the untenable foreign government's pro test of the litigation triggering criterion from the To rres approach proper, leaving the approach more expansive than even its proponents advocate.
B. Th e Torres Reproach
This Section advances pragmatic and doctrinal criticisms of the To rres approach. First, this Section argues that the To rres approach threatens to swamp the federal courts by funneling an overwhelming amount of litigation into the federal system. Second, this Section con tends that constitutional doctrine requires that the bulk of civil litiga tion remain in the state courts. Finally, this Section argues that the To rres approach's attempt to avoid these problems by limiting federal question jurisdiction to cases implicating only important foreign policy concerns presents an unworkable regime. 205. See Weisburd, supra note 69, at 20 ("To argue that federal common law must gov ern whenever a case implicates the international relations of the United States is to provide a basis for taking all cases with international elements out of the state courts."). tional corporate defendant involved in transnational litigation access to the federal removal docket would overwhelm the system, even if the federal courts remanded most of these cases.207 From a purely practical perspective, the To rres approach must be rejected, leaving state courts to hear the bulk of international cases. The federal judici ary simply does not have the capacity to take them.
Constitutional doctrine counsels against the adoption of the To rres approach as well. The federal courts, unlike the state courts, are courts of limited jurisdiction, requiring constitutional and congressional authority to hear cases.208 As a consequence, since the founding of the Republic the state courts have provided the primary fora for litiga tion. 209 As Alexander Hamilton argued in Fe deralist 82 , "the States will retain all pre-existing authorities which may not be exclusively dele gated to the federal head ... history illustrates that judge-initiated expansions of federal judicial power are met with disdain by both Congress and the states.211 The Torres approach invites a radical realignment in the federated nature of the United States judicial system by allowing a large percentage of civil suits access to the federal courts.212 This realignment is contrary to the primary tenets of judicial federalism. For this reason, the view should be rejected.
Lack of Ju dicial Competence in Fo reign Af fa irs
The previous two critiques of the To rres approach are predicated upon giving the approach an expansive reading. A proponent of the view could retort that this is not the best reading of the Torres ap proach, arguing that the approach attempts to prevent this flood of litigation from inundating the federal courts by restricting its expan sion of federal jurisdiction only to cases implicating important foreign policy concerns,213 and thus enabling the approach to avoid the prag matic and doctrinal concerns raised above. The To rres approach's ef forts to stem this tide of litigation fails on two grounds.
First, restricting the expansion of federal jurisdiction to important policy concerns does not alleviate the pragmatic concern.214 The Torres approach's proposed limitation upon federal jurisdiction requires that the federal courts determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the in stant litigation raises important foreign policy concerns.215 This pro vides a strong incentive for defendants to remove to federal court, if for no other reason than as a stalling tactic. Even if a vast majority of cases involving foreign affairs were remanded to state court, the sheer volume of motions to remand could swamp the federal courts.216
Second, even if this case-by-case review of motions to remove is feasible, the judiciary, as the Patrickson court convincingly argues, is not well suited to make foreign policy decisions. courts have little context or expertise by which to analyze and address the potential implications of a lawsuit on foreign relations."218 This lack of competence is worsened by the fact that, when assessing the foreign relations implications of litigation, courts seldom rely on for eign policy authorities.219 "Rather, they usually make a simple intuitive judgment about the foreign relations consequences of the adjudica tion."220 These uninformed, intuitive judgments, when made on a case by-case basis, lead to decentralized, non-uniform foreign policy proc lamations by the federal courts.221 Such a result is perverse, as the rai son d'etre for the federal common law of foreign relations is to prevent differing judicial rulings in the foreign affairs arena.222
The To rres approach has led to such differing judicial rulings in practice. In To rres itself, the Fifth Circuit, with no apparent consulta tion from the State Department or other foreign affairs authority, con cluded that the litigation raised important foreign policy concerns.223 The court intuited that foreign policy concerns were raised because mining is a large part of the Peruvian economy and the government was intimately involved in this particular mining site.224 The same Fifth Circuit panel, less than a month later, intuited that a suit against Germany's leading natural gas producer concerning a deal worth hun dreds of millions of dollars involving nearly a quarter of the volume of the North Sea's Heimdal gas field did not raise foreign policy con cerns.225 Both cases seem to raise foreign policy concerns equally; that is to say, both involve huge sums of money, both involve industries 224. Id. 225. Marathon Oil Co. v. Rurhgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997).
crucial to their domestic economies and both governments protested the litigation.226 This factual congruence leads one to view the deci sions as inconsistent. 227 The effect of the To rres approach is to give preferential judicial treatment to certain countries based upon courts' merely intuitive analysis of American relations with that country. However, decisions concerning which nations are to be favored by American foreign policy properly belong to the political branches.228 Thus, the Torres approach's attempt to limit the volume of litigation sweeping into the federal courts via its liberal use of federal common law of foreign relations is unworkable.
III. AN ANACHRONISM JUST IN THE NICK OF TIME: A TRADITIONAL JURISDICTIONAL VIEW IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
An unworkable Torres approach presents a quandary. Federal common law of foreign relations cannot be restricted, as the Patrickson court would have it, merely to questions concerning the validity of the acts of foreign sovereigns. Even though this outlook prevents illegitimate corporate flight to federal fora, established case law compels a broader view. By the same token, federal common law of foreign relations cannot be so broad that it destroys the balance be tween the state and federal court systems and allows easy access to federal rubber stamp forum non conveniens dismissals for transna tional corporate defendants as the To rres approach does. Moreover, an approach to the federal common law of foreign relations should avoid the sort of jurisdictional case-by-case intuitive reasoning relied upon by the To rres approach.
Part III argues for a way out of this quandary that fosters on the merits defenses of corporate overseas conduct. Section III.A argues that limiting federal common law of foreign relations to issues directly involving the conduct of foreign sovereigns fits well with established case law, and that, in most cases, it is easier to apply than competing approaches. This foreign sovereign conduct approach would leave the bulk of cases implicating foreign relations, when a sovereign is not a party, in state court. Section III.B addresses legitimate concerns raised by this result, arguing that indispensable party doctrine, coupled with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), and choice of law doctrine dispel most of them. In an effort to illustrate the effects of the foreign sovereign conduct approach, Section III.C applies it to facts of Patrickson and To rres.
A. Fo reign Sovereign Conduct Approach
Having rejected the jurisdictional extremes of To rres and Patrickson, the scope of federal common law of foreign relations must be reconceived. A review of the case law finds that limiting the federal common law of foreign relations to adjudicating issues of foreign sov ereign conduct fits well with precedent. Additionally, this view of fed eral common law of foreign relations offers an ease of applicability for jurisdictional purposes not afforded by competing models.
Scope of Established Fe deral Common Law of Fo reign Relations Case Law
Excluding the To rres line of cases, established case law presents a relatively defined scope for the federal common law of foreign rela tions. Having a foreign sovereign as a named party to a case is not necessary or sufficient to implicate the federal common law of foreign relations. Indeed, the federal common law of foreign relations never provides federal subject matter jurisdiction when a foreign sovereign is a named defendant.229 On the other hand, a foreign sovereign acting as plaintiff will not always have its complaint governed by the federal common law of foreign relations.230 Moreover, cases lacking a foreign sovereign as a named party may implicate the federal common law of foreign relations.231
The federal common law of foreign relations, regardless of the status of the parties to the litigation, governs uniquely federal issues raised by state causes of action. These uniquely federal interests in clude the following: applying the act of state doctrine;232 adjudicating the enforceability of foreign non-judicial decrees within the United States;233 subjecting a foreign sovereign's public policies to judicial evaluation;234 applying customary international law;235 and resolving diplomatic, military and immigration issues not governed by congres sional or executive branch action.236
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'! City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that the ef fect of an act of a foreign state "must be treated ... as an aspect of federal law" (internal citation omitted)).
233. See Marcos, 806 F.2d at 353 (holding that the enforceability of Filipino Executive orders are a matter of federal law); Republic of Iraq, 353 F.2d at 50 (holding that the en forceability of a non-judicially ordered confiscatory decree is a matter of federal law). Some courts have gone so far as to find that the enforcement of foreign judicial judgments and de crees should be governed by federal common law of foreign relations. See The theme that holds these five areas together is that they all in volve the interaction of the United States with the official conduct of foreign sovereigns.237 The first area, the act of state doctrine, governs the respect the United States will grant to the acts of foreign sover eigns within the foreign sovereign's territory.238 The second area, en forceability of non-judicial foreign decrees, governs the weight the United States will grant to the acts of foreign sovereigns within American territory. The third area, judicial evaluation of foreign pub lic policy, governs the level of scrutiny applied to the policies of for eign sovereigns. The fourth area, customary international law, primar ily governs relations between sovereigns in the absence of treaty law or general legal principles.239 And the fifth area, the vesting of diplo matic, military and immigration issues exclusively in the federal gov ernment, controls which American governmental entities may offi cially interact with foreign sovereigns.240 This theme provides a concise rubric for the scope of federal common law of foreign relations: fed eral common law of foreign relations governs how the United States reacts to the official conduct of foreign sovereigns in the absence of congressional or executive branch action.
This view of foreign affairs, limiting the scope of federal common law to the conduct of foreign sovereigns, is unquestioningly an anach ronistic view of international relations. Traditionally, international law and foreign relations were the exclusive domain of nations in their sovereign capacities.241 This is no longer the case as non-sovereign enlikely that the federal courts will often have to resort to federal common law to resolve is sues of immigration, diplomatic or military concern. See This anachronistic perspective is not a mark against the foreign sovereign conduct approach. There is no doctrinal principle that re quires the federal common law of foreign relations to track innova tions in actual international affairs, while there are overwhelming con stitutional principles that require the bulk of litigation to remain in state court.245 As there must be a clear limit to the range of the federal common law of foreign relations, lest every case with an international element be subject to federal common law,246 the federal common law of foreign relations must lag behind the ever-expanding scope of in ternational affairs.
Ease of Administrability
The foreign sovereign conduct approach is easier for courts to ap ply than the Torres approach because this perspective, with its five ar eas of applicability, is fairly well defined as compared with the merely intuited boundaries of the To rres approach. The first and second areas of federal common law of foreign relations, the act of state doctrine and the enforceability of non-judicial foreign decrees, are almost me chanically applicable for jurisdictional purposes. The court need only satisfy itself that the foreign state actually engaged in the act or made the decree pleaded. The third area, limiting the scope of state evalua tion of a foreign sovereign's public policy, is easily applied for jurisdic tional purposes. A reading of the state statute in question, or a quick review of how it is applied, should readily reveal whether the state is normatively evaluating the public policy of foreign sovereigns. The fifth area, federal control of immigration, military and diplomatic af fairs, is a jurisdictional slam-dunk. These are constitutionally assigned to the federal government, placing federal subject matter jurisdiction beyond question. The fourth area, customary international law, provides a partial exception to this ease of administrability advantage. Determining whether binding customary international law exists on a particular is sue requires voluminous compilation of past practice of nations and case law from numerous authorities.247 Nevertheless, the foreign sov ereign conduct approach remains superior to the To rres approach on this score. Even when the foreign sovereign conduct approach pres ents taxing problems, such as determining past practice of nations and compiling customary international case law, the difficulties presented are judicially cognizable ones as opposed to the To rres approach's in tuitive foreign policy judgments. Further, the foreign sovereign con duct approach constructs a frame to contain future expansions of fed eral common law of foreign relations beyond the five established areas, limiting the evolution of the federal common law to areas where a foreign sovereign's conduct is at issue. The Torres approach provides no such concrete limiting principle.
The foreign sovereign conduct model surpasses the only other competing model for limiting the scope of the federal common law of foreign relations.248 Professor Goldsmith's motive review model holds that the federal common law of foreign relations should apply only to prevent state action motivated by a state's desire to conduct its own foreign affairs.249 Such a view comports well with the Zs chernig line of cases.250 Nevertheless, Goldsmith's view is inferior to the foreign sov ereign conduct approach on two counts. First, the motive review model does not have the ease of administrability that the foreign sov ereign conduct model has for jurisdictional purposes. The motive re view model requires a case-by-case review, similar to the Torres ap-proach, to determine if the state legislature was improperly moti vated.251 Moreover, determining legislative motives is notoriously dif ficult. 252 The foreign sovereign conduct approach, on the other hand, often offers bright line jurisdictional tests. Second, the motive review model excludes the other four established areas of federal common law of foreign relations. Such a view is simply inconsistent with en trenched case law. 253 Goldsmith himself admits as much.254 Addressing Goldsmith's arguments against the whole concept of federal common law of foreign relations is beyond the scope of this Note.255 As the goal of this inquiry is to provide the best view of what the law is, not what it ought to be, it will have to suffice to say that Goldsmith's exclusion of the remaining four well-established areas of federal common law of foreign relations is not regarded by most authorities as an accurate portrayal of current law.256
B. Remaining Concerns and Remedies
Following the foreign sovereign conduct approach, most defen dants seeking federal question jurisdiction by claiming that vital sov ereign and economic interests are at issue will find themselves in state court. Nonetheless, leaving cases that strike at vital interests of foreign nations in state court does raise some legitimate concerns. For exam ple, it is often stated that state courts may issue parochial or divergent rulings in such cases.257 This Section argues that the indispensable party258 and choice of law doctrines259 mitigate these fears.
Indispensable party doctrine protects many of the interests a for eign sovereign might have concerning state court litigation. A foreign sovereign, though not a party to a private transnational litigation in state court, may be so wrapped up in the transactions leading up to the litigation that it qualifies as an indispensable party. Every state has some formulation of indispensable party doctrine similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.260 The federal rule provides that a party is indispensable if (1) in the party's absence, complete relief cannot oth erwise be accorded to the present parties, or the absent party claims an interest in the litigation that may subject the present parties to in consistent, or multiple judgments, or a judgment in the present litiga tion may, as a practical matter, impair the absent party's interest; (2) and the court determines in equity and good conscience that the litiga tion should not proceed without the absent party.261 Failure to join an indispensable party provides a court with reason to dismiss.262
In most private transnational cases, parties will not be able to join a foreign sovereign as an indispensable party, thus protecting the in terest of foreign sovereigns by providing state courts with grounds for dismissal. The FSIA is the sole means of acquiring subject matter ju risdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant.263 Although the PISA does provide a few exceptions,264 it generally excludes state and fed eral courts from taking subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sover eign defendants.265 Thus, non-party foreign sovereigns may not be joined in most private transnational litigation. If the interests of the foreign sovereign are such that it will be prejudiced by the continua- 264. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994 & Supp. 2001) (courts do have subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns if the sovereign has waived the immunity, is involved in commercial activities, is taking property in the United States, is acquiring a gift by succession in the United States, has committed torts in the United States, was involved in specified maritime activities, or engaged in or sponsored terrorist activity).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1994) (providing jurisdictional immunity to foreign sover eigns, and entities owned by them, in state and federal court subject to listed exceptions).
tion of the case in its absence, state courts have reason to dismiss the case. 266 On the other hand, if a foreign sovereign meets one of the excep tions listed by the FSIA (e.g., by engaging in commercial activity267) and it is joined into state court litigation, the foreign sovereign "has an absolute right of removal to the federal courts."268 If a foreign state's interests are so intertwined with those of state court litigants that it is joined in the litigation, it is protected from potentially parochial state adjudication by removal to federal court.
Even if a private transnational case, with a fact pattern similar to Patrickson, remained in state court, choice of law doctrine protects the interests of affected foreign sovereigns. Although the states employ a wide range of choice of law doctrines,269 generally they are "generous about the relative strength and acceptability of a foreign state's inter est as reflected, for example, in California's comparative impairment technique."270 Indeed, in fact patterns such as those found in Torres and Patrickson -where the plaintiffs are foreign citizens suing in tort for injuries that occurred in their home country and foreign law favors the instate defendant -most states will apply the substantive law of the foreign state.271 Thus, even if a foreign state's interests are not so commingled with those of private transnational state court litigants as to be an indispensable party or to be joined, the foreign sovereign's interests will often be safeguarded by applying its substantive law in the litigation.
Finally, if a foreign sovereign is unhappy that a suit, to which it is not a party, is proceeding in state court, it can seek to intervene in the litigation, thereby triggering an absolute right of removal to federal court.272 Most states have a civil procedure provision comparable to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.273 Rule 24 allows non-litigants to intervene when the intervenor has an interest relating to the subject matter of the suit, the intervenor, as a practical matter, is likely to be impaired in this interest by the disposition of the suit, and the existing parties do not adequately represent the intervenor's interests.274 If a foreign sovereign has legitimate interests that a suit in state court is likely to impact negatively, it may seek to intervene.275 Should the court grant the motion to intervene,276 the foreign sovereign can pro tect its interests by its absolute right to remove to federal court and to seek a federal forum non conveniens dismissal.277
C. Patrickson and Torres Revisited
In practice, the foreign sovereign conduct approach will leave most transnational cases in state court. Id. 276. An intervenor may seek to intervene as of right or permissively. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 273, at 374. 277. Kern, 867 F. Supp. at 530. Many foreign sovereigns may decline to take this strategy as it involves a degree of risk, because the foreign sovereign must allow itself to become a defendant. If the federal court refuses, as is unlikely, to grant a forum non conveniens dis missal, the foreign sovereign could be found liable for damages. 279. Id. 280. The validity of Panama's, et al., actions within its territory are not at issue, see supra note 232, the extraterritorial validity of Panama's, et al., actions are not at issue, see supra note 233, Hawaiian law does not require a normative evaluation of Panama's, et al., public policy, see supra note 234, there are not issues of customary international law raised, see supra note 235, nor are issues of military, diplomatic or immigration law raised, see supra note 236.
281. See supra Section l.A.l.
American nations involved in
Patrickson heavily depend upon agricul ture, the Patrickson litigation may very well strike at vital economic interests of these nations. These interests should be adequately pro tected in Hawaiian court by the choice of Panamanian, Costa Rican, Ecuadorian, or Guatemalan substantive law.
The Torres case presents a more complicated picture. Plaintiffs in Torres brought state tort claims against SPCC, alleging personal inju ries from sulfur dioxide emissions.282 Unlike the governments involved in Patrickson, the government of Peru was involved in SPCC's mining operation.283 Nonetheless, based on the facts presented, the plaintiffs' claims do not appear to implicate issues governed by federal common law of foreign relations.284 As the complaint appears to fail both the Holmes and necessary construction tests, the case should remain in Texas state court.285 Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the state court would take the case to trial. Peru's intimate involvement with SPCC's mining operation -including ownership of the refinery from 1975-1994, during which time many of the plaintiffs were allegedly injured286 -could lead a court to conclude that Peru is an indispensable party. This would provide the court with reason to dismiss the case.287 On the other hand, it is possible that the commercial activities exception to the FSIA would apply to Peru's conduct. 283. Id. at 543 (Peru owns the land being mined, owns the mineral, extracted, grants SPCC concessions for a fee, and owned the refinery itself until 1994).
284. That is to say, the validity of Peru's actions within its territory are not at issue, see supra note 232; the extraterritorial validity of Peru's action are not at issue, see supra note 233; Texas law does not require a normative evaluation of Peru's public policy, see supra note 234; there are not issues of customary international law raised, see supra note 235, nor are issues of military, diplomatic or immigration law raised, see supra note 236. 291. If the foreign sovereign conduct approach were adopted, corporate defendants such as Dole Food and SPCC, presumably, would take actions to minimize the impact of this approach. Such actions might include the following: first, corporate defendants could seek to persuade state courts or legislatures to adopt the federal standard for forum non conveniens
